Art.17 Par 2. Principal By Induction
1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime; and
2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission
of the crime by the material executor.
One cannot be held guilty of having instigated the commission of
the crime without first being shown that the crime was actually
committed (or attempted) by another.
Thus, there can be no principal by inducement (or by indispensable
cooperation) unless there is a principal by direct participation.
But there can be a principal by direct participation without a
principal by inducement (or by indispensable cooperation).
Two Ways Of Becoming Principal By Induction:
1. By directly forcing another to commit a crime by :
a) Using irresistible force.
b) Causing uncontrollable fear.
In these cases, there is no conspiracy, not even a unity
of criminal purpose and intention. Only the one using the
force or causing the fear is criminally liable. The
material executor is not criminally liable because of
Art. 12, pars. 5 and 6 (exempting circumstances)
2. By directly inducing another to commit a crime by –
a) Giving of price, or offering of reward or promise.
The one giving the price or offering the reward or
promise is a principal by inducement while the one
committing the crime in consideration thereof is a
principal by direct participation. There is collective
b) Using words of command The person who used the words of
command is a principal by inducement while the person
who committed the crime because of the words of command
is a principal by direct participation. There is also
collective criminal responsibility.
Requisites for words of command to be considered inducement:
1. Commander has the intention of procuring the commission
of the crime
2. Commander has ascendancy or influence
3. Words used be so direct, so efficacious, so powerful
4. Command be uttered prior to the commission
5. Executor had no personal reason
NOTE: Words uttered in the heat of anger and in the
nature of the command that had to be obeyed do not
make one an inductor
The inducement must precede the act induced and must
be so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it, the act would not have been performed.
Mere imprudent advice is not inducement.
If the person who actually committed the crime
had reason of his own to commit the crime, it
cannot be said that the inducement was
influential in producing the criminal act.
Effects Of Acquittal Of Principal By Direct Participation Upon
Liability Of Principal By Inducement:
1. Conspiracy is negatived by the acquittal of co- defendant.
2. One cannot be held guilty of having instigated the commission
of a crime without first being shown that the crime has
been actually committed by another.
But if the one charged as principal by direct participation
is acquitted because he acted without criminal intent or
malice, his acquittal is not a ground for the acquittal
of the principal by inducement.
REASON FOR THE RULE: In exempting circumstances, such as
when the act is not voluntary because of lack of intent
on the part of the accused, there is a crime committed,
only that the accused is not a criminal.
While in the course of a quarrel, a person shouted to A, “Kill
him! Kill him!” A killed the other person. Is the person who
shouted criminally liable? Is that inducement?
- No. The shouting must be an irresistible force for the one
shouting to be liable.
There was a quarrel between two families. One of the sons of
family A came out with a shotgun. His mother then shouted,
“Shoot!” He shot and killed someone. Is the mother liable?
People v. Balderrama 226 SCRA 537 (1993),
Ernesto shouted to his younger brother Oscar, “Birahin mo na,
birahin mo na!” Oscar stabbed the victim. It was held that there
was no conspiracy. Joint or simultaneous action per se is not
indicia of conspiracy without showing of common design. Oscar
has no rancor with the victim for him to kill the latter.
Considering that Ernesto had great moral ascendancy and influence
over Oscar, being much older (35 years old), than the latter, who
was 18 years old, and it was Ernesto who provided his allowance,
clothing, as well as food and shelter, Ernesto is principal by
People v. Agapinay, 188 SCRA 812 (1990),
The one who uttered “kill him, we will bury him.” while the
felonious aggression was taking place cannot be held liable as
principal by inducement. Utterance was said in the excitement
of the hour, not a command to be obeyed.
People v. Madall, 188 SCRA 69 (1990),
The son was mauled. The family was not in good terms with their
neighbors. The father challenged everybody and when the neighbors
approached, he went home to get a rifle. The shouts of his wife
“here comes another, shoot him” cannot make the wife a principal
by inducement. It is not the determining cause of the crime in
the absence of proof that the words had great influence over the
husband. Neither is the wife’s act of beaming the victim with a
flashlight indispensable to the killing. She assisted her husband
in taking good aim, but such assistance merely facilitated the
felonious act of shooting. Considering that it was not so dark and
the husband could have accomplished the deed without his wife’s
help, and considering further that doubts must be resolved in
favor of the accused, the liability of the wife is only that of